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SPORTY'S FARM L.L.C., V. SPORTSMAN
MARKET INC.-PROTECTING AGAINST
CYBERSQUATTING OR EXTENDING THE
ALLOWABLE REACH OF TRADEMARK LAW
ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB
INTRODUCTION
With the explosion of Internet usage and the development of e-
commerce, businesses are no longer able to avoid the World Wide
Web. As commercial transactions evolved and producers became
more and more distant from individual consumers, businesses
came to rely on trademarks to distinguish their products.' Today,
businesses use trademarks to differentiate their products, as an
indicator of consistent quality, and to develop brand names.2
Because the Internet has even further removed the producer from
the consumer, the need for businesses to capitalize on their
trademarks is more pronounced. Indeed, the use of one's
trademark as a domain name has been increasingly important in
securing a business' Internet dominance. Unfortunately, domain
name registration policies work against the trademark holder and
because traditional doctrines in trademark law such as
infringement, dilution and unfair competition proved insufficient
to protect a trademark owner's rights, many have been pushing for
alternative solutions. In 1999, Congress responded by enacting the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"). 3 The
1 Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 789, 796 (1997).
2 Id. at 790 (citing J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and
Unfair Competition, § 3.01(2)).
3 THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, Pub. L. No. 106-
113,113 U.S.C. § 1509 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)). Section 43 of
the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. § 1125) section is amended to read as
follows:
(d) (1) (A) Any person who, with a bad faith intent to profit
from the goodwill of a trademark or service mark of another,
registers, traffics in, or uses a domain that is identical to,
1
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ACPA targets cybersquatting, the deliberate registration of a
domain name in violation of a trademark owner's rights,4 by
prohibiting bad faith registrations of distinctive marks as Internet
domain names that are intended to profit from the trademark's
goodwill. 5  Specifically, Congress sought to prevent the
registration of distinctive trademarks by four different classes of
cybersquatters.
6
In the first application of the ACPA by an appellate court, the
Second Circuit held in Sporty's Farm L.L. C. v. Sportsman Market,
Inc., that the appellant, Sporty's Farm, was liable for registering
the domain name "Sporty's" in violation of the trademark owner's
rights.7 Although the lower court had applied the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), the appellate court, in choosing
to apply the newly passed ACPA, affirmed the district court's
holding on different grounds.
8
confusingly similar to, dilutive of such a trademark or service
work, without regard to the goods or services of the parties,
shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of the mark, if the
mark is distinctive at the time of the registration of the domain
name.
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from the mark, including a
personal name which is protected as a mark under this section;
and
(ii)registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that-
(I)in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly
similar to that mark;
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly
similar to or dilutive of that mark;
4 THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. No.
106-140, at 5 (1999).
5 Sporty's Farm L.L.C., v. Sportsman Market Inc., 202 F.3d 489,495 (2d Cir.
2000) (quoting S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4).
6 S. REP. No 106-140, at 6. The types of cybersquatters targeted by the
ACPA include those registering domain names to exact payment from the
trademark owner, or to the highest bidder, to divert consumers from the mark
owner's site to the cybersquatter's site, or those that instead are defrauding
consumers by suggesting associations with the well known trademark.
7 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499.
8 Id. at 500.
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In Part I, this comment explores why the domain name
registration process has created a problem for trademark owners.
Additionally, Part I will examine how trademark holders have
attempted to resolve the problem by utilizing the traditional
remedies afforded trademark owners. Finally, Part I will examine
congressional intent in passing the ACPA and how it intended to
protect trademark owners from cybersquatters. Part II examines
the Second Circuit's ruling in Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman
Market, Inc. and subsequent cases and how the Court's have
applied the ACPA. Finally, Part 1H of the comment discusses the
impact of the Second Circuit's decision on the future of the ACPA
and whether it offers a viable alternative to protect trademark
owner's rights on the Internet.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Conflict Between Domain Name Registration and Trademark
Protection
1. Defining What A Domain Is
Each site on the Internet is given an Internet protocol ("IP")
address that consists of a series of numbers. 9 To locate a site on
the World Wide Web, one must enter the IP address of the desired
site.10 However, because of the relative difficulty of remembering
the IP address, an easy to remember alphanumeric domain name,
corresponding to the IP address, is used instead.11
9 Ira Nathanson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Coral: Property
Rights and Personal Jurisdiction Over Squatters, Poachers and Other
Parasites, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. 911, 919 (1997).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 919. To communicate on the Internet, it is necessary to log on
through a server. The server will interpret a domain name into its IP address.
Because all servers interpret domain names exactly alike, the same domain
name will locate the same site regardless of the server used; see generally G.
3
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The domain name, which reads from right to left consists of
several different levels each separated by a period. 12 Beginning
from the far right, all domain names are composed of a top-level
domain name (TLD), corresponding to either a generic or
geographic designation. 13  The second level domain (SLD), a
subdomain of the TLD, appears to its immediate left. 14 The
domain name holder usually chooses the SLD name and any
additional subdomains that appear to the left of the second level.
15
To locate a site on the World Wide Web, the entire domain name,
including the TLD, must be entered following the standard
"http://www.' 16 string citation.
17
2. Domain Name Registration
Prior to May 1999, Network Solutions Inc. ("NSI"), was
primarily responsible for registering domain names; now there are
more than twenty-four companies handling the registration of
Peter Albert, Article, Right on the Mark: Defining the Nexus Between
Trademarks and Internet Domain Names, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 277 (1997).
12 Id. at 920.
13 Id. at 919-920. The six generic TLDs include: ".com" for commercial;
".edu" for educational institutions; ".gov" for federal governmental agencies;
".net" for Internet infrastructure; ".mil" for the U.S. military; ".org" for
organizations; the geographical TLDs correspond to country designations; see
generally G. Peter Albert, Article, Right on the Mark: Defining the Nexus
Between Trademarks and Internet Domain Names, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 277.
14 G. Peter Albert, Article, Right on the Mark: Defining the Nexus Between
Trademarks and Internet Domain Names, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 277,280. "An example of a domain name with additional levels is
'purchasing.xyzcompany.com."
15 Id.
16 Ira Nathanson, Showdown at the Domain Name Coral: Property Rights
and Personal Jurisdiction Over Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 58 U.
PITT. L. REv. at 919. The "http:l/" stands for Hypertext Transfer Protocol and
the "www" to the "host," in this case the world wide web.
17 Id. at 919.
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domain names. 18 Because these domain name registries do not
check the Patent Trademark Office (PTO) registries, a domain
name holder can register a federally protected trademark as a
domain name as long as the domain name holder seeks registration
prior to the trademark holder.19 Once a trademark has been
registered as a domain name, the trademark owner may attempt to
resolve the conflict by utilizing the registry's formal dispute
resolution policy.20 If a domain name holder is able to prove that it
obtained a valid trademark registration on the principal registry
prior to receiving a cease and desist letter by the trademark owner,
the domain registry will not pursue the matter any further; 21 thus,
it does not matter that the trademark owner had a prior trademark
registration date.22 If the domain name holder cannot provide such
proof, it does have the right to contest the trademark owner's
complaint by having the domain name placed on "Hold" status.23
Neither the domain name holder nor the trademark owner may use
a domain name on "Hold". 24 Once the domain name is on "Hold,"
the parties may only resolve the dispute through litigation.
25
3. The Source of Conflict
The ability of a trademark owner to use the trademark as a
domain name is of vital importance. When an Intemet user is not
aware of a company domain name, the user may find the desired
web site by performing a key word search on an Internet search
18 Jeffery J. Look, Article, The Virtual Wild, Wild, West (WWJH9: Intellectual
Property Issues in Cyberspace-Trademarks, Service Marks, Copyrights and
Domain Names, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 49,55 note 30 (1999). The
NSI Policy for registration of a domain name is virtually similar to the policies
of the others. Id.
19 Id. at 60
20 Id. at 61
21 Id.
22 Id. at 62
23 Id.
24 Look, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. at 62 (1999).
25 Id.
195
5
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engine.26 If the company has a recognizable trademark, the user
27
will often use this trademark as a key word. To ensure that its
site is easily located, it is in the best interests of a company to use
its trademark as a domain name.28 Because the inability to use
one's trademark as a domain name due to another Internet user's
registration diminishes the ability to profit from one's own
trademark on the Web, this is often the source of litigation against
cybersquatters.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Federal Dilution Doctrine in
Cybersquatting Cases
Despite the existing dispute resolution policies, many trademark
owners have involved the courts in protecting their trademarks.
The federal causes of action applied include trademark
infringement, unfair competition and dilution under the Federal
Lanham Act.29 Although courts have held cybersquatters liable for
trademark infringement, relying on Senator Leahy who, prior to
co-authoring the ACPA, exclaimed "it is my hope that this anti-
dilution statute (FTDA) can help stem the deceptive Internet
addresses," 30  courts have increasingly found cybersquatters
culpable for dilution.' Thus, I will primarily limit my review of
cybersquatting cases to those applying the FTDA.32
26 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998)
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 The Federal Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; § 1125 (a);§ 1125 (c).
30 See 141 Cong. Rec. 38561 (1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also
Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326.
31 Ira Nathanson, Comment, Showdown at the Domain Name Coral:
Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction Over Squatters, Poachers and Other
Parasites, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. at 960 note 283.
32 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c):
c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks. (1) The owner of a famous mark
shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the
court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial
use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has
become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to
[Vol. XI:191
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1. Historical Background - The Federal Trademark Dilution Act.
Trademark law, unlike the Constitutionally mandated copyright
and patent law, was designed with the aim of reducing consumer
confusion, not to promote and reward creativity. 33 Thus, courts
have been unwilling to elevate the trademark right to a property
right in gross, as with a patent or copyright grant. 4  The
"trademark owner has a property right (in his trademark) only
insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer confusion as to who
produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation." 35 Thus, the
central concern in trademark infringement suits has been the
likelihood of consumer confusion.36
Because trademark dilution, a cause of action emerging from
state statutes, protects a trademark's distinctive quality from
dilution even in the absence of confusion, it represents a departure
from the traditional consumer confusion model.37  Frank
Schechter, the earliest proponent of dilution theory advocated
granting distinctive trademark owners an in gross property right.38
obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining whether
a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not
limited to - (A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or
services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising
and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in
which the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with
which the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading
areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or
similar marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under
the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal
register.
33 Klieger, supra note 1, at 792.
34 Id.
35 Id. (quoting Int'l Order of Job's Daughter's v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980)).
36 Id. at 793.
37 Klieger, supra note 1, at 793.
38 Id. at 796-797.
7
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In his view, because the trademark represented a business asset
indistinguishable from any other tangible asset, it deserved to be
protected like any other property investment.39 Although courts
have now almost uniformly accepted Schechter's proposal that the
gradual whittling away of mark's distinctive quality is the real
harm caused by the concurrent uses of similar marks, the in gross
property right theory has never been legislatively adopted.
4 °
Because the in gross property right has not been adopted, mere
proof that a junior user's mark is identical or similar to a senior
user's mark is not sufficient to establish dilution.41 Instead, when
Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"),
the Act specifically required that the infringing use must "cause, . • •42
dilution" of the famous and distinctive trademark.
In formulating a test for dilution under the FTDA, courts have
uniformly accepted the first few statutory requirements-that the
mark is famous and distinctive, that the defendant's use is in
commerce, and is commercial. However, they have differed on the
final element, specifically how to interpret what "causes dilution"
means. 43 Many courts have interpreted the FTDA's "causes
dilution" language to require a demonstration of likelihood of
dilution44 through either blurring or tarnishment.45 Many courts
39 Id. at 797.
40 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., v. Utah Div. Of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999).
41 Id.
42 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
43 See generally Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey., 170 F.3d at 457.
According to the Court, "the real interpretative problem [in determining what
causes dilution] has been how harm to the senior mark's selling power resulting
from the junior user mark's use could be proved." In response to this dilemma,
have adopted several approaches to determine "what causes dilution."
44 See Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 787 (S.D. Tex. 1996),
rev'd on other grounds, 141 F. 3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998); American Exp. Co. v.
CFK, Inc, 947 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
45 Blurring is the gradual diminishment of an "established trademark's
selling power and value through its unauthorized use." Hormel Foods Corp. v.
Jim Henson Prod., No. 95 Civ. 5473 (KMW), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13886
*14 (S.D. NY Sept. 22, 1995) (quoting Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A. Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2nd. Cir. 1989)). Tamishment, in
[Vol. XI: 191
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have applied a multi-factor test first proposed by Judge Sweet in
analyzing a state anti-dilution claim to determine the likelihood of
dilution under the FTDA.46 However, the Fourth Circuit in
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development, held that because the multi-factor
likelihood of dilution test was ineffective in considering the harm
to the senior mark's selling power that resulted from the junior
mark's use, the FTDA required proof of actual dilution.
47
Specifically, the Ringling Bros. court held that to prove dilution
the similarity between the marks must evoke a mental association
of the two "which is the effective cause of an actual lessening of
the senior mark's selling power, expressed as 'its capacity to
identify and distinguish goods or services.' 4 8 Thus, the court held
that to prevent granting rights in gross in a trademark, dilution
could not be based solely on "visual similarity.5
49
2. The Application of the FTDA to Cybersquatters.
Because the element of direct competition or consumer
confusion is often absent in trademark suits against cybersquatters,
the plaintiffs have increasingly relied on the FTDA for help. As a
result, courts have adjusted their interpretation of FTDA to
respond to the unique issues that cybersquatting presents. For
example, the courts now recognize three categories of dilution,
besides the more traditional notions of blurring and tarnishment,
the courts now recognize dilution through cybersquatting.
50
contrast to the often abstract "whittling away of a trademark's selling power,"
results from direct injury to a plaintiff's goodwill and reputation. Id.
46 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1035 (2d. Cir. 1989); see also Johnson Publ'g Co. v. Willitts Design Int'l,
Inc., No. 98 C2653, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9624 *23 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1998);
see also American Exp., 947 F. Supp. at 317.
47 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey., 170 F.3d at 464.
48 Id. at 458.
49 Id. at 459.
50 Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326).
9
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In non-cybersquatting cases, satisfying the "commercial use"
requirement has not been problematic. In the typical dilution case,
it is the commercial use of another's trademark that causes the
lessening of the mark's ability to function as an identifier.
However, the typical cybersquatter is not registering the trademark
as a domain name and then using the domain name as a trademark.
In other words, the cybersquatter is not generally attempting to sell
anything from the web site, but rather to warehouse the domain
name to later sell it back to the trademark owner or the highest
bidder. Thus, courts have to stretch the commercial use
requirement from its traditional conception.
i. The Toeppen Cybersquatting Cases.
a. Intermatic Inc., v. Toeppen
5
In one of the seminal cybersquatting cases, Intermatic v.
Toeppen, the Seventh Circuit applying the FTDA denied summary
judgment in favor of defendant, Dennis Toeppen, leaving him to
face charges that he violated the FTDA through cybersquatting.5 2
Toeppen had registered more than 200 domain names, including
the trademarked names of many business, such as
deltaairlines.com, ramadainn.com, and also the plaintiff's
trademark as intermatic.com. 53  Toeppen did not use
intermatic.com in connection with any goods or services nor did he
attempt to sell anything from the intermatic.com site. 54 According
to Toeppen, his only aim in registering the sites was to later resell
or license the domain name back to trademark holders such as
Intermatic. 55  The court, in denying Toeppen's summary
judgement motion, held that because Intermatic had exclusively
used its "strong fanciful federally registered mark" for over fifty
51 Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1227.
52 Id. at 1241.
53 Id. at 1230.
54 Id. at 1233.
55 Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1236.
[Vol. XI:191200
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years, its mark was famous enough to come within the purview of
the FTDA. 56 Significantly, the court held that Toeppen's desire to
resell the domain name was sufficient to satisfy the "in commerce"
requirement.
5 7
b. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen58
In this case against Toeppen, Panavision brought suit against
Toeppen for registering its trademark, Panavision, claiming that
Toeppen had diluted its trademark through the registration of the
corresponding domain name.59  In Panavision, Toeppen's web
page at Panavision.com, displayed an aerial view of Pana,
Illinois.60  The court followed Intermatic, in holding that61
Toeppen's registration satisfied the commercial use requirement.
Furthermore, the court recognized that the registration of the
trademark as a domain name by someone other than the trademark
holder could potentially frustrate consumers trying to locate the
trademark owner's site.62 Because this frustration could lead many
consumers to conclude that the trademark owner owned no website
or discourage them from continuing to search for the desired site,
the court held that Toeppen's registration of Panavision's
trademark as a domain name constituted dilution.
63
ii. Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky
6 4
Jews for Jesus represented a departure from the traditional cases
against cybersquatters such as the cases against Dennis Toeppen.
Here, the plaintiff, a non-profit religious organization brought suit
56 Id. at 1239.
571d.
58 Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316.
59 Id. at 1319.
60 Id. at 1325.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1327.
63 Id.
64 Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282 (D.C.N.J. 1998).
11
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against the defendant for the "deliberate diversion by the
defendant's site of Internet users to the Internet site established by
the defendant." 65 Unlike Toeppen, the defendant cybersquatter
was not attempting to sell the registered domain name; rather, the
defendant, an attorney, registered the site "jewsforjesus.org" to
post critical commentary about the plaintiffs organization and its
religious teachings. 66  Also distinct from the Toeppen cases was
the fact that the plaintiff organization had already registered 'jews-
for-jesus.org" as a domain name.67 In analyzing the plaintiffs
federal dilution claim, the court found that the plaintiffs use of its
name Jews for Jesus for the past twenty-four years, and its
extensive media advertising and publication supported that it was a
famous mark, thereby entitling it to protection under the FTDA.68
The court held that the defendant's use was not a protected non-
commercial use. 69 To the contrary, the court found that the in
commerce requirement was satisfied because the defendant's
disparaging comments prevented the plaintiff from exploiting its
name and mark.7 °
iii. Avery Dennison Corp., v. Sumpton71
In Avery Dennison v. Sumpton, the Ninth Circuit reversed a
lower court holding that plaintiff Avery Dennison was entitled to
enjoin the defendant's use of the domain names "avery.net" and
"dennison.net," and remanded with instructions that summary
judgement be entered in favor of the defendant.72 The plaintiff had
been using the mark since the 1930's and owned the trademark for
"Avery" since 1963.73 The mark "Dennison" had been use since
65 Id. at 287.
66 Id. at 290.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 306.
69 Jews For Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 308.
70 Id.
71 Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d 868.
72 Id. at 871.
73 Id. at 873.
[Vol. XI: 191202
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the late 1880's and was registered in 1908. 74 The company also
owned the domain names "avery.com" and
"averydennison.com." 75 The dispute involved a defendant who
had registered over 12,000 Internet domain names.7 6 Unlike most
cybersquatters, the defendants maintained that they chose the
trademark domain names not because they represented trademarks
but because they were common last names.77 Further, they were
not selling the domains to the trademark owners or even the
highest bidders, instead they were licensing the domain names at
modest prices for use as email addresses.78
The Circuit Court distinguished famousness from distinctiveness
in holding that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that its marks
were famous. 79 In making its ruling, the court weighed heavily its
belief that dilution causes of action "tread very closely to granting
'rights in gross' in a trademark." 80 To prevent the overprotection
of trademarks, the court held that only those trademarks that were
truly famous were entitled to protection from dilution.8 1  In
assessing the commercial use requirement, the court held that
because the defendants were licensing the domain names for e-
mailing purposes, a non-commercial and personal use, it was not
using the trademarks as traditional trademarks as required by case
law to establish commercial use. 82 In addressing dilution through
cybersquatting,83 the Avery Dennison court held that defendants
use of the ".net" TLD versus the plaintiffs ".com" TLD created a
genuine issue as to whether Internet users would be confused into
thinking that the plaintiffs site did not exist.84 The court deferred
74 Id.
75 Avery Dennison v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp. 1337, 1341, note 5 (D.C. Cal.
1998).
76 Id. at 1338.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 880.
83 Id. In examining the likelihood of dilution, the court addressed both
dilution through cybersquatting and tarnishment.
84 Id. at 881.
13
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judgment on the tarnishment claim as an issue that could not be
resolved at summary judgment.8 5
C. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
8 6
1. Congressional Intent.
Congress in passing the ACPA indicated several reasons for the
legislation. Specifically, it noted that despite the relative
effectiveness of the FTDA, cybersquatters have become
sophisticated enough to escape liability, leaving trademark holders
without an effective way to protect their trademarks. 87 Also of
significance was the Congressional finding that often the number
of domain name infringements creates such a costly situation that
trademark owners are prevented from asserting their legitimate
rights. 88 To protect trademark owners with distinctive or famous
marks from having to pay-off cybersquatters, but still preserving
protected trademark uses, Congress limited liability under the
ACPA to "bad-faith registrations" only.89 Congress further voiced
its intention to preserve the fair use defense and to protect all uses
85 Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 881.
86 THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, PUB. L. No.
106-113,113 U.S.C. 1509 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d))
87 THE ANTICYBERSQUATrING CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, S. REP. No.
106-140, at 7 (1999).
88 Id.
In cases where a trademark owner can sue, the sheer
number of domain name infringements, the costs associated
with hundreds of litigation matters, and the difficulty of
obtaining damages in standard trademark infringement and
dilution actions are significant obstacles for legitimate
trademark holders. Frequently, these obstacles lead trademark
owners to simply "pay off' cybersquatters, in exchange for
domain name registration, rather than seek to enforce their
rights.
89 Id. at8
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traditionally protected by the First Amendment.90 Specifically, it
noted that "lawful non-commercial or fair uses of others' marks
online, such as in comparative advertising, comment, criticism,
parody, news reporting, etc....even where done for profit would
not alone satisfy the bad faith intent requirement."
91
2. Defining Bad Faith
Under Subsection (d)(1)(B) of the ACPA, Congress outlined a
non-exclusive and non-exhaustive list of nine factors a court can
examine to determine if the requisite bad faith exists.92 According
to Congress, the first four factors suggest the absence of bad faith
while the last three create a presumption of bad faith.93  In
explaining the fourth factor, the non-commercial fair use
exception, Congress made reference to Panavision, specifically
explaining that the ACPA was not intended to allow cybersquatters
to evade the holding in that case.
94
3. In rem Jurisdiction
The ACPA offers trademark owners the ability to file an in rem
suit against the domain name itself where it has unsuccessfully
attempted to locate the domain name holder.95  The relief
90 Id. at 11.
91 Id. at 13.
92 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(B).
93 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 9 (1999).
94 Id. at 14. "This bill would not allow a person to evade the holding of that
case - [Panavision v. Toppen] which found that Mr. Toeppen had made a
commercial use of the Panavision marks and that such uses were in fact, diluting
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act-merely by posting non-infringing
uses of the trademark on a site accessible under the offending domain name, as
Mr. Toeppen did."
95 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(2)(A). The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil
action against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name
registry or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain
name is located if-(i) the domain name violates the right of the owner of a mark
205
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attainable in an in rem suit, however, is limited to an injunction
ordering forfeiture, cancellation, or transfer of the domain name.
96
In assessing the need for in rem jurisdiction, Congress noted that
because cybersquatters often register domain names under aliases
to avoid identification, establishing a trademark infringement
claim against a cybersquatter is even more difficult than a
traditional infringement suit.97  However, in balancing the
legitimate privacy interests of Internet users against the trademark
owners rights, Congress limited in rem jurisdiction to those cases
where the trademark owner's due diligence failed to reveal the
identity of the registrant, provided that the trademark owner can
demonstrate a substantive violation of trademark law.98 Although
the domain name registry is charged with turning over the domain
name to the court during the pendency of in rem suit, the Act
limits the domain name registry's liability to bad faith conduct.
99
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a)
or (c); and (ii) the court finds that the owner - (I) is not able to obtain in
personam jurisdiction over a defendant who would have been a defendant in a
civil action under paragraph (1); or (II) through due diligence was not able to
find a person who would have been a defendant in a civil action under
paragraph (1) by-(aa) sending a notice of the alleged violation and intent to
proceed under this paragraph to the registrant of the domain name at the postal
and e-mail address provided by the registrant to the registrar; and (bb)
publishing notice of the action as the court may direct promptly after filing this
action.
96 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(2)(D)(i). The remedies in an in rem action under
this paragraph shall be limited to a court order for the forfeiture or cancellation
of the domain name or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the
mark. Upon receipt of written notification of a filed, stamped copy of a
complaint filed by the owner of a mark in a United States district court under
this paragraph, the domain name registry or other domain name authority shall-
(I) expeditiously deposit with the court documents sufficient to establish the
court's control and authority regarding the disposition of the registration and use
of the domain name to the court; and (II) not transfer, suspend or otherwise
modify the domain name during the pendency of the action, except by court
order.
97 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7 (1999).
98 Id. at 10.
99 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(D)(ii). The domain name registry or registrar or
any other domain name authority shall not be liable for injunctive or monetary
[Vol. M:191206
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4. Remedies Under the ACPA.
Under the ACPA a trademark owner would be entitled to
traditional remedies afforded trademark owners such as the
issuance of an injunction, 100 and an award of damages.' 0'
Additionally, the Act allows a trademark owner to recover
statutory damages in an amount not less than $1,000 and not more
than $10,000 for every domain name violation. 1°2 However, any
damages may be applied prospectively only, therefore the Act does
not apply to any bad-faith registrations which occurred prior to its
adoption.10
3
relief under this paragraph except in the case of bad faith or reckless disregard,
which includes a willful failure to comply with any such court order.
100 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) is amended to read as follows: The several courts
vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this chapter shall have
power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity upon such terms
as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the
registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office or to prevent
a violation of sections 1125(a), (c), or (d) of this title.
101 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) is amended to read as follows: When a violation of
the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a
violation under section 1125 (a), (c) or (d) of this title, shall have been
established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be
entitled subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and
subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.
102 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) now reads as follows: In a case involving a violation
of section 43(d)(1), the plaintiff may elect, at any time before final judgment is
rendered by the trial court, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an
award of statutory damages, in an amount of not less than $1,000 and not more
than $100,000 per domain name, as the court considers just.
103 PUB. L. No. 106-113 § 3010.
207
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I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN SPORTY'S FARM
V. SPORTSMAN'S MARKET'
0 4
A. Facts
In the 1960's, the defendant, Sportsman's Market Inc.
("Sportsman"), a well-known mail order catalog among pilots,
began using the mark "Sporty" in connection with its catalog.1
0 5
In 1985, it registered the mark Sporty with the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO"). 106  The mark has appeared on the
cover of its catalog since that time and has been featured on both
its international and domestic toll free numbers. 10 7 Sportsman's
yearly advertising budget for the Sporty's mark is 10 million
dollars. 10
8
The Omega Company, a mail order catalog for scientific
process, decided in late 1994 or early 1995, to enter the aviation
catalog business by forming a wholly owned subsidiary called
Pilot's Depot, LLC.10 9 The owner of Omega, a pilot, had received
Sportsman's catalog and was therefore aware of the Sporty's
trademark." 0
In January 1996, Omega formed another subsidiary called
Sporty's Farm to sell and grow Christmas trees.111 Soon after
forming the subsidiary, Omega registered the domain name
"sportys.com" with NSI, and sold the rights to its domain name for
$16,200 to its subsidiary.112 Sporty's Farm then began advertising
its Christmas trees on the "sportys.com" web page. 13 However,
104 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d 489 (2nd Cir. 2000).
105 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 493.
106 Id. at 494
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 494.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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Sporty's Farm did not begin its operations or even obtain the
domain name from Omega until filing suit against Sportsman.
114
Omega's CEO and manager of Sporty's Farm, when asked why
he chose the particular domain name, explained that it was meant
as a reference to the Pennsylvania land where Sporty's Farm
operates. 115 According to the CEO, as a child he had a dog-called
Spotty, and when the dog strayed, his uncle took him to his farm in
upstate New York;' 16 thereafter, he began calling the farm Spotty's
Farm. 1' 7 He claimed that Sporty's Farm was a derivation of this
phrase. 118
B. The Court's Analysis
1. Procedural Posture
In March 1996, Sportsman's first learned of Omega's
"sportys.com" registration;' 19 however, before it could take any
action, Sporty's Farm brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment
for the right to continue using "sportys.com."' 20  Sportsman
counter-claimed for trademark infringement, trademark dilution
under the FTDA, and state unfair competition.12 1  Following a
bench trial, the district court rejected the trademark infringement
claim, holding that because the parties operated completely
unrelated businesses there was no likelihood of confusion. 122 The
district court held in favor of Sportsman on its FTDA claim.'2 3 It
found that the "Sporty's" mark was a famous mark entitled to
114 Id. at 498.
115 Id. at 494.
116 Id.
117 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 494.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 494.
122 Id.
123 Id.
209
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protection. 124 Further, the court found that because the registration
of "sportys.com" prevented Sportsman's from using its trademark
as a domain name, Omega and its subsidiary Sporty's Farm had
affected Sportsman's ability to distinguish its goods on the
Internet, and thereby diluted its valid trademark; 12 5 however, the
court refused to award punitive damages or attorney's fees under
the FTDA because it held that evidence of willful dilution was
absent.126 Instead, the court granted Sportsman an injunction
requiring Sporty's Farm to give up all rights to the "sportys.com"
domain name. 127 The district court also held that Sportsman had
failed to support its state unfair competition claim because it had
not established that Sporty's Farm had behaved immorally, or
unscrupulously.1
2 8
Both Sporty's Farm and Sportsman appealed the lower court's
ruling on different grounds-Sporty's Farm appealed the district
court's injunctive grant and Sportsman cross-appealed the denial
of damages.1
2 9
2. The Applicability of the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act
While the case was pending an appeal, Congress passed the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act ("ACPA"). 3 ° By
the time the appellate court reviewed the case the ACPA was
already in place; 13 thus, the Second Circuit chose to affirm the
lower court's holding not based upon the FTDA, but solely on the
new Act.132 The first part of the court's analysis involved whether
the ACPA applied to the case. In making its final determination,
124 Id.
125 Id. at 495.
126 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 495.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 PUB. L. No. 106-113. The ACPA was passed August 19, 1999.
131 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 495.
132 Id.
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the court relied heavily on the Congressional Record. Specifically,
the court noted that Congress had passed the ACPA to remedy the
inability of the FTDA to effectively address the cybersquatting
issue.133 Because it found the present case to fall within the
category of cybersquatting cases the Act was designed to address,
the Court held that application of the ACPA was correct.
134
Further, the facts of the case suggested that the Court could review
the case under the ACPA "without difficulty.
135
3. Substantive Analysis of the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act.
i. Famous and Distinctive Marks
Having resolved that the ACPA was applicable, the Court began
a substantive analysis of the Act. First, it examined whether the
133 Id. In concluding that the ACPA was "passed to remedy the perceived
shortcomings of applying the FTDA in cybersquatting cases," the court noted
the following quote from S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7:
While the [FTDA] has been useful in pursuing
cybersquatters, cybersquatters have become increasingly
sophisticated as the case law has developed and now take the
normal precautions to insulate themselves from liability. For
example, many cybersquatters are now careful to no longer
offer the domain name for the sale in any manner that could
implicate liability under existing trademark dilution case law.
And in cases of warehousing and trafficking in domain names,
courts have sometimes declined to provide assistance to
trademark holders, leaving them without adequate and
effective judicial remedies. This uncertainty as to the
trademark law's application on the Intemet has produced
inconsistent judicial decisions and created extensive
monitoring obligations, unnecessary legal costs and
uncertainty for consumers and trademark owners alike.
134 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d 497.
135 Id.
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"Sporty's" mark was distinctive and famous. Without resolving
whether the Sporty mark was famous, the court held that it was
entitled to protection as a distinctive mark.136 Indeed, the Court
found that in many respects, Sportsman had succeeded in proving
that "Sporty's" met the criteria entitling a mark to protection under
the FTDA-that it was both famous and distinctive. 137 Further.
the Court did not respond to Sporty's Farm's allegation that the
"Sporty's" mark was not famous because Sportsman could not
prove that it was as equally well known to Sporty's Farm
consumers as in the aviation industry. 13 8  Instead, the Court
reasoned that the mark was entitled to protection under the ACPA
because the Act specifically extended protection not only to
famous but also to distinctive marks without regard to the level of
fame.139 According to the Court, "distinctiveness refers to inherent
qualities of a mark and is a completely different concept from
fame. ' 140 A famous mark, on the other hand, could be so
"ordinary, or descriptive" as to be non-distinctive, despite its level
of recognition.
14 1
ii. Identical or Confusingly Similar Marks
The next substantive factor the court examined was whether the
domain name was identical or confusingly similar to the
trademark. In analyzing the SLD, the court concluded that
although "sportys.com" was not exactly identical to the mark
"sporty's," the differences were inconsequential.' 42 It held that the
domain name was "confusingly similar" as demanded by the
136 Id.
137 Id. at note 10 (referring to the criteria set forth in 15 U.S.C.§ 1125
(c)(1)).
138 Id. (referring to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(F)).
139 Sporty's Farm, Nos. 202 F.3d at 497.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 497-498.
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ACPA;143 thus, precise similarity was not required to prove the
second element. 
144
iii. Bad-Faith Requirement
The final substantive issue involved the existence of bad-faith.
The court made reference to the nine, non-exclusive factors the
statute advises courts to look at when determining the existence of
bad faith. 145  In examining such factors, it noted that neither
143 Id.
144 Sporty's Farm, Nos. 98-7452, 98-7538, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1246 at
**21.
145 Id. at note 12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B) reads as follows:
In determining whether there is a bad faith intent described under
subparagraph (A), a court may consider such factors as but not limited to-
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of
the person, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the
legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise
commonly used to identify that person;
(III) a person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or
services;
(IV) the person's legitimate non commercial or fair use of
the mark in a site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the
mark owner's online location to a site accessible under the
domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the
mark, either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish
or disparage the mark, by creating likelihood of confusion as
to source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell or otherwise
assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party
for substantial consideration without having used, or having
an intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide offering of
goods or services;
(VII) the person's intentional provision of material and
misleading false contact information when applying for the
registration of the domain name;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names which are identical to, confusingly similar to,
23
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Omega nor Sporty's Farm owned any intellectual property rights
in the domain name "sportys.com," and that it did not consist of
Omega-the corporate entity registering the name. 146 Additionally,
although the domain name included elements of "Sporty's Farm,"
it recognized that Sporty's Farm did not exist at the time of
registration. 147 Further, the Court held that the third statutory
factor, the prior use of the domain name in connection with the
bona fide sale of goods or services, weighed heavily against
Sporty's Farm because of the fact that Sporty's Farm began selling
its trees on the site only after litigation began demonstrated a lack
of good faith. 148 Finally, it examined two other factors suggesting
bad faith. First, Sporty's never claimed a non-commercial use of
the site and secondly, because Omega sold its domain name under
suspicious circumstances - only after filing suit and to a
subsidiary selling non-competing goods.
149
The Court in explaining the existence of bad faith as the most
important basis for its holding, recognized several non-enumerated
factors which equally demonstrated bad faith. 150 For example, the
Omega owners were quite aware of the strength of the Sporty's
mark for aviation related products before attempting to register the
domain name "sporty's.com." 151 Furthermore, the facts revealed
that Omega planned to become a direct competitor of Sportsman in
the aviation market. 152  The Court also weighed heavily that
Omega created its "Sporty's Farm" subsidiary several months after
or dilutive of trademarks or other service marks of others that
are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain
names without regard to the goods or services of such
persons; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark in the person's domain
name is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning of
subsection (c)(1) of section 43 [subsection (c)(1) of this
section].
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 499.
149 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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initiating litigation only to 1) use the "sportys.com" domain name
commercially; 2) prevent Sportsman from using its trademark as a
domain name and 3) to insulate itself from a likelihood of
confusion claim under trademark infingement.15 3 The final factor
the Court relied upon was that the explanation given for adopting
the name Sporty's Farm was extremely lacking in credibility."'
4. The Court's Remedy
The Court held that based upon its substantive analysis of the
ACPA, Sporty's Farm violated Sportsman's rights.' 55 In deciding
what remedy to provide, the Court noted that while damages are
allowed under the ACPA, it prohibited any retroactive awards.1
5 6
Because the Court was unwilling to overturn the district court's
holding that there was no evidence of willfulness as clearly
erroneous, it was unavailable to provide damages under the
FTDA; 157 however, because according to the ACPA injunctions
may be awarded retroactively,15 8 the court chose to affirm the
injunction issued by the district court. Specifically, the court
affirmed the district court's cancellation and transfer of the
"sportys.com" domain name and permanently enjoined both
Omega and Sporty's Farm from taking any action that might
hinder Sportsman from obtaining the domain name. 159
In response to the injunction, Sporty's Farm argued that even if
it did violate the FTDA or the ACPA, requiring it to abandon its
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499.
156 Id at 500. In this instance, because the ACPA was passed while the case
was pending, Sportsman's Market, Inc. would not be awarded damages
retroactively.
157 Id. at 501. Although the court held that there was ample evidence
demonstrating both Omega's and Sporty's Farm's bad faith, it held that even
assuming the Sporty's mark was famous, it could not disturb the district court's
failure to find willful dilution given the uncertainty of the law.
158 PUB. L. No. 106-113 § 3010
159 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 501.
215
25
Navai: Sporty's Farm L.L.C., v. Sportman Market Inc.--Protecting Against
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J ART. & ENT. LAW
use of the mark would be impermissibly retroactive. 160 The court
responded, holding that application of a statute passed during the
pendency of a suit is permissible when the statute affects
prospective relief.161 In such an instance, the Court reasoned that
the statute is not being applied retroactively. 162  Because the
injunction did nothing more than prevent future harm, the Court
held that the ACPA was being applied prospectively and thus, no
retroactivity problem existed. 163 In so ruling, the Court dismissed
Sporty Farm's last minute arguments that the district court's
application of the FTDA constituted an unconstitutional taking of
its property in the "sportys.com" domain name and its injunction
grant under the FTDA was inequitable. 
16 4
5. Cases Following Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's, Inc.
i. Shields v. Zuccarini
165
The plaintiff, Joseph Shields, sought to enjoin the defendant, an
admitted domain name wholesaler, from operating from five of the
three thousand domain names he had registered.1 66 Specifically,
Shields was concerned with five domain name registrations that
were variants of the name Joe Cartoon, a cartoon he had
popularized. 167 Although Shields had previously registered the
domain name as his web site, the defendant registered several
variants of the domain name including: joescartoon.com,
joecarton.com, joescartoons.com and cartoonsjoe.com. 168 Once an
individual had mistakenly logged on to any of the defendants Joe
160 Id. at 502.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at note 17.
165 Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp.2d 634 (E.D. Penn., 2000).
166 Id. at 635.
167 Id.
168 Id.
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Cartoon sites, they were unable to exit the site without first
clicking on a series of advertisements.1 69 The defendant received
between ten to twenty-five cents for every click from various
advertisers. 170 Once Shields filed suit, the defendant changed the
content of the five disputed web sites to include political protests
against Shield's cartoons and their "alleged" graphic content.
171
In applying the ACPA, the court followed the substantive factors
set forth by the Second Circuit in Sporty's Farm, determining first
whether the mark was distinctive or famous, and secondly whether
the domain names were confusingly similar and finally whether
the defendant acted in bad faith.'72 In analyzing the first factor,
the court followed Sporty's Farm in applying the criteria set forth
under the FTDA for determining famousness. 73 After noting that
Shields, the only individual using the Joe Cartoon name, had
operated under the name for fifteen years, the court concluded that
the mark was distinctive. 174 After further analyzing the factors set
forth by the FTDA, the court held that the Joe Cartoon mark was
both famous and distinctive and therefore entitled to the
protections afforded by the ACPA.175  However, the court
acknowledged that unlike the FTDA, Shields was only required to
demonstrate either distinctiveness and fame under the new Act.
176
The court quickly concluded that Shields had proved the second
element-that the defendant's domain name registrations were
confusingly similar to Shield's mark by noting that the defendant
had chosen the marks precisely for their similarities to the Joe
Cartoon mark.177  In addition, the court noted that several
consumers had acknowledged having been confused by the
defendant's domain names.
178
169 Id.
170 Shields, 89 F. Supp.2d at 635.
171 Id.
172 Id. 638-640.
173 Id. 638.
174 Id.
175 Shields, 89 F. Supp.2d at 638.
176 Id. at 639.
177 Id.
178 Id. (citing Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 at 4).
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The court, applying the statutory factors for determining bad
faith, concluded that there was "compelling evidence of his
[defendant] bad faith., 17 9  Most notably, the court sited the
defendant's practice of deliberately registering common
misspellings of the plaintiffs mark to divert unsuspecting
consumers to his sites.1 80 The court was also mindful that the
defendant had begun his non-commercial political protest of
Shields only after being sued.181 Moreover, the court saw little
merit to the defendant's argument that the cartoons were too
graphic.' 8 2 In opting to issue a preliminary injunction, the court
also took into consideration the threat of damage to the plaintiffs
reputation and good will.
183
The defendant, like Sporty's Farm, responded that the court had
impermissibly retroactively applied the ACPA and therefore the
injunction constituted an unconstitutional taking.1 4  The court,
following the Second Circuit in Sporty's Farm, concluded that the
injunction was only providing prospective relief 18 5
i. Cello Holdings, L.L. C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Co.
18 6
The Plaintiff, Cello Holdings, L.L.C. (hereinafter "Cello") was
involved in the "hi-end" market for professional recording studio
work, selling audio equipment. 1 7  In 1995, Cello obtained a
federal trademark for the mark "Cello" in connection with
"amplifiers, preamplifiers, tone controls, speakers, switch boxes,
179 Id. at 640.
180 Shields, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 640.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 640-641. We find it hard to believe, in light of all the graphic,
violent, and more troubling images present in popular culture, that Shield's
cartoon so shocked and appalled Zuccarini that he was compelled to launch a
political protest.
183 Id. at 641.
184 Shields, 89 F. Supp.2d at 642.
185 Id..
186 Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Co, 89 F. Supp.2d 464 (S.D.
N.Y. 2000).
187 Id. at 467.
[Vol. XM:191218
28
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol11/iss1/7
2001] SPORTY'S FARM V SPORTSMAN MARKET
power supplies and associated accessories."' 88  In 1997, the
defendant, Storey, registered the domain name "cello.com" as part
of an effort to register several other musical instruments. 189 He
was unsuccessful in all attempts except "cello.com." 190  At the
time, he was unaware that Cello was a brand name for audio
equipment. 191 After registering the mark Storey sent several e-
mail messages in an attempt to sell "cello.com" as well as offering
it for sale via a website called "logicaldomain.com."'
192
Cello brought an action alleging a claim under the FTDA,
however, while a summary judgment ruling was pending, the
ACPA was enacted. 193  Therefore, Cello sought to amend the
complaint to include a claim under the ACPA. 194 Like Shields, the
court in Cello opted to follow the Second Circuit's interpretation
of the ACPA. Applying the eight-factor test annunciated in the
FTDA as well as the ACPA, the court concluded that a reasonable
fact finder could find that the Cello mark was not famous.' 95 The
court weighed heavily the fact that cello is a common noun and
has been widely used by third parties, including several domain
name registrations including the word cello. 196 The wide spread
usage of the word cello by various companies led the court to
conclude that the mark could be viewed as a weak, rather than
distinctive mark.1
97
Because the "cello.com" domain name was virtually identical to
the "Cello" mark, the court did not examine the second element
confusing or identicall similarity. The court did, however,
examine whether the defendant had acted in bad faith. Although,
the court found several of the statutory factors under the ACPA
suggested bad faith, it held that there was ample evidence
188 Id. at 468 (quoting Adams Decl. Ex. B).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Cello, 89 F. Supp.2d at 468.
193 Id. at 469.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 472.
196 Id.
197 Cello, 89 F. Supp.2d at 473.
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suggesting that the defendant had not acted in bad faith and that he
had not attempted to extort another's trademark.198  In so
concluding, the court differentiated an innocent intent to profit
from the proscribed bad-faith intent to profit holding that a
reasonable person might not find Storey's attempt to register the
common domain as evidence of trademark extortion.1 99 Finally in
denying both parties summary judgment motions, the court
weighed heavily that Cello had not explained why the court should
be granting it greater rights "than the other dozens of companies
that have registered "Cello" alone or in combination, or that have
been using "Cello" in their company name. 20
ii. People For the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals, Inc. v.
Doughney20 1
The defendant, Michael Doughney, registered the domain name
"PETA.org" with Network Solutions for a non-profit organization,
"People for Eating Tasty Animals. ' 02 Doughney used the Internet
site as "a resource for those who enjoy eating meat, wearing fur
and leather, hunting, and the fruits of scientific research. ' 20 3 In
response to a suit initiated by People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals ("PETA") for trademark dilution, the defendant claimed
that his site was a mere parody of PETA. °4 The court found in
favor of the plaintiff under the FTDA, holding that the defendant's
web site had blurred PETA's famous mark.2 °5 The court held that
the defendant's site had lessened the PETA trademark's selling
power by including material directly adverse to PETA's purpose
and including links to "commercial enterprises engaged in conduct
198 Id. at 474.
199 Id.
200 Id. at 474-475.
201 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals Inc. v. Doughney, 113 F.
Supp.2d 915 (E.D. Va. 2000).
202 Id. at 918.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 921.
205 Id. at 920.
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directly contrary to PETA's animal protection efforts., 20 6 Thus,
the court held that by providing hyperlinks to commercial web
sites, the defendant's web site satisfied the commercial use
requirement of the FTDA, even though his site contained no
commercial activities.20 7
The court further held that the defendant violated the ACPA.
208
As evidence of bad faith the court noted once again that the
defendant had intended to divert consumers to his web site to
display information contrary to the plaintiffs mission, thereby
harming the goodwill of PETA.20 9 The court rejected the
defendant's parody argument, holding that a parody exists only
when "two antithetical ideas appear at the same time."
210
According to the court, because an Internet user would not know
that the defendant's site was not an official PETA site until they
actually entered the site, the defendant could not claim the parody
defense.21'
III. IMPACT
Because the primary focus of Federal dilution law is not
consumer confusion, but a property right in the mark, there is a
danger of overextending the allowable reach of trademark law and
providing a trademark owner a property right in gross, much like
in patent or copyright law.212  It was this concern that led the
206 Id.
207 People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals, 113 F. Supp.2d at 920..
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 921.
211 Id.
212 Robert Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. at 820. "In the final
analysis, however courts have neither divorced dilution from the recognition of
rights in gross nor erected any significant barriers to its overtaking the
consumer protection model;" see also Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey, 170
F.3d at 456. "As commentators have fairly observed, the effect of this radical
dilution model would have been to create property rights in the narrow category
of marks it protected, making them comparable...to those protected by patent
2001]
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Fourth Circuit to advocate an actual dilution test under the
FTDA.213 The ACPA was enacted out of concerns for a business'
viability on the Internet and its ability to capitalize on the growing
e-commerce industry.214 Although the ACPA was designed with
some of the more egregious forms of cybersquatting in mind, it
also comes dangerously close to granting the trademark owner a
property right in gross. Under the ACPA, the threshold is dropped
even further-now trademark owners not entitled to protection
under federal dilution law are granted an in gross property right on
the Internet, thanks to the ACPA. This follows because a
trademark does not need to be famous to qualify for protection
under the ACPA, where at least arguably it did under the FTDA.
Secondly, how thoroughly courts choose to examine the bad faith
element could impact whether trademark owners will have
extended protections under the ACPA. If examined superficially,
the bad faith element may provide the court an opportunity to
extend the trademark owner's rights.
A. The ACPA and the Overprotection of Trademark Rights.
Critics of the FTDA, who contend that the Act provides an in
gross property right, often cite the Act's failure to conclusively
identify what marks are famous enough to warrant protection.
15
None of the eight statutory factors as written, critics maintain,
adequately identify which marks qualify for protection under the
and copyright law (referring to the fact that some critics of dilution law have
suggested that to prove the existence of dilution, one need not establish an
economic harm.)
213 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey, 170 F.3d at 464.
214 S. Rep. No. 106-140, at4.
The purpose of this bill is to protect consumers and
American businesses, to promote the growth of online
commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for trademark
owners by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of
distinctive marks as Interet domain names with intent to
profit from the goodwill associated with such marks.
215 Robert Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REv. at 844.
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FTDA. 16 What is even more problematic, say critics, is that often
courts apply the fame requirement without even mentioning the
eight statutory factors, relying on conclusory language instead.217
The end result is a broad grant of an in gross property right.218 It
was precisely the fear of extending the trademark right that
resulted in limiting dilution protection to famous marks only.
If dilution protection were accorded to
trademarks based on a showing of inherent or
acquired distinctiveness, we would upset the
balance in favor of over-protecting trademarks, at
the expense of potential non-infringing uses.219
While distinctiveness of a mark is incorporated by statute into
the analysis, it alone will not support a finding of fame; 220 thus,
even arbitrary or fanciful marks, considered inherently distinctive
in the confusion context, are not necessarily entitled to dilution
221protection.
While the dilution analysis under the FTDA may lead to
overprotection of marks that are not truly famous, the ACPA, by
protecting both distinctive and famous marks, would increase the
likelihood of overprotection. Under the ACPA, any distinctive
mark is entitled to protection, even though it does not rise to the
threshold level of fame. What is more problematic is that the
ACPA does not make clear whether it is using the same standard
for determining distinctiveness as under infringement analysis. 22
216 Id. at 850.
217 Id. at 849 (noting that the court in Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment
Group, Ltd., held that the plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of prevailing
on its federal dilution claim without even considering whether the plaintiff's
mark was famous).
218 Id. at 850.
219 Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 875.
220 Id.
221 Robert Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. at 842.222 Id. at 843. The problem posed here is similar to that faced by those
attempting to interpret the FTDA because the House Report regarding the
FTDA never addresses whether distinctiveness for dilution purposes is analyzed
2232001]
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Thus, a finding that a trademark is arbitrary, which is considered
distinctive under traditional infringement analysis, would suffice
to afford a mark protection under the ACPA. While it is a wise
policy decision to protect such a trademark from a cybersquatter
attempting to extort money from the trademark owner, it is not
wise to protect such a mark in the absence of such conduct. It
would only result in the granting of a monopoly in a trademark
over the Internet where none would exist traditionally.
The aim of trademark law is after all to prevent consumer
confusion, not to grant the trademark owner a monopoly as is
afforded a copyright owner or patent owner. This is precisely why
traditional trademark law takes into consideration such factors as
similarity of the products in its traditional likelihood of confusion
analysis to determine trademark infringement. Even under
traditional dilution analysis courts often consider "the geographical
extent of the trading area in which the mark is used., 223 All such
tests are designed to limit the trademark owners right in the
trademark. In the world of cyberspace, and now with the passage
of the ACPA, all considerations to limit the trademark owners
right in the trademark have fallen by the wayside and are wholly
absent. In cyberspace, a trademark owner is granted an in-gross
property right in the mark; thus, the only requirement for a
plaintiff to secure this right is to register its mark with the PTO.
The ACPA has led trademark law down a dangerous path indeed.
B. The Bad-Faith Requirement-Will it Mitigate the Possible
Overprotection
As the bad faith requirement stands, review by the courts is
wholly discretionary. Furthermore, the ACPA does not mandate
that the court consider any one of the factors set forth to determine
in the same fashion as under the likelihood of confusion test. Yet again,
Congress failed to take the opportunity to make any clarifications regarding the
distinctiveness analysis.
223 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1)(D).
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bad faith;224 thus, courts eager to prevent cybersquatting could
with only a cursory review find bad faith even when none really
exists. There is nothing in the ACPA to suggest that such an
outcome is not likely. On the other hand, Courts may give too
much weight to certain factors such as, the intention to divert
consumers in a way that could harm the goodwill of a trademark.
The court in the PETA case weighed heavily this factor and
thereby prevented critical commentary, even parody of the People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. Doughney, unlike Toeppen,
was not the classic cybersquatter, nor was he attempting to blur 225
his product for the product being offered by the PETA
organization. Furthermore, neither dilution by tamishment, nor
any cause of action under trademark law was not designed to
prevent parody or to set limits on the First Amendment. However,
if the PETA case is any indicator, the ACPA could have a chilling
effect on free speech on the World Wide Web. Future individuals
may shy away from displaying their critical commentary or parody
of groups like PETA for fear that they may be liable under the
ACPA. Further, such individuals might be relegated to using
obscure domain names, and thereby loose all ability to reach the
masses with their Constitutionally protected speech.
However, if courts were to seriously consider that the bad-faith
requirement was meant to prevent the classic cybersquatters, and
not chill free speech then it is conceivable that this factor may
mitigate the granting of an in-gross property right to trademark
owners. Unfortunately, as the PETA case demonstrates, there is
nothing to prevent such an effect under current ACPA law.
224 Debra Baker, Standing up to Cybersquatters, Judges Are Seizing on New
Legislation to keep Web Site Pirates from Taking a Name for Themselves, 86
ABA Journal 21 (2000).
225 Though the court found blurring, specifically because the hyperlinks to
other commercial web sites had lessened the trademarks selling power, there is
no justification for concluding that providing critical commentary, though it
might lessen one's trademark's selling power, is actionable given First
Amendment protections.
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CONCLUSION
When the ACPA was enacted there was a serious need in
traditional trademark law to prevent cybersquatting and individuals
like Dennis Toeppen from engaging in extortion. Though
Congress was right to address this issue, the subsequent case law
seems to suggest that the ACPA is not as narrow as it should have
been tailored. As a result, concerns regarding the overprotection
of trademarks, which began with the advent of dilution law, have
failed to fall by the wayside. In fact, the World Wide Web, indeed
the digital age itself, has bred new life into these issues. Only time
will tell if courts are mindful of the overprotection of trademarks.
After all, they are the last bastions to defend the original purpose
of trademark law.
Yasaman Navai
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